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TAX STRUCTURE AND TAX COMPLIANCE
James Alm, Roy Bahl, and Matthew N. Murray *
Abstract-A model of individual tax compliance behavior,

including evasion and avoidance, is developed and estimated.
The model recognizes the importance of marginal income tax

Clearly, data availability is even more problematic when looking at the choice among evasion,

rates, payroll tax contributions and benefits, and the probabil-

avoidance, and reported income. In addition, pre-

ity of detection and the penalty on unpaid taxes. Share

vious work has not looked at the avoidance-

equations for avoidance, evasion and reported income are
estimated using individual-level data. The estimation results
indicate that the tax base rises with higher benefits for payroll
tax contributions and falls with higher marginal tax rates; the

base also falls with more severe penalties and more certain
detection of evasion as individuals substitute towards avoidance income.

evasion-compliance decision as a joint process,
even though these decisions are made simultane-

ously.2 Further, both strands of the literature
have ignored another factor that may affect the

compliance decision: the benefits that accrue from
participation in payroll programs. If benefits are

T HE methods by which individuals reduce
their tax liabilities take a variety of legal and

illegal forms, all of which are influenced at least
in part by incentives created by the tax structure.

These methods can be broadly classified as avoidance and evasion. Tax avoidance is any legal

activity that lowers taxes, such as worker substitution between wage and nonwage compensation.
Tax evasion is the reduction in tax liabilities by
illegal means, such as underreporting income on

tax returns. Despite extensive-but separate

literatures on avoidance and evasion, we know
very little about the tax base response to changes
in tax structure. It is the purpose of this paper to

examine the role that the tax structure plays in
compliance.
There are several reasons for the persistence of

the compliance puzzle. Most prominent is the
absence of detailed individual data that would

allow a full empirical specification of all factors
affecting compliance. This difficulty is most evident when searching for individual data on the
evasion-compliance decision. Even when available, data have never allowed in the same work

the construction of both tax and audit variables.1

tied only to taxable income, then their presence
gives individuals an incentive to pay taxes. In
short, there has been no empirical work that
analyzes the effects of tax rates, probabilities,
penalties, and payroll benefits on avoidance and
evasion choices of individuals.
In this paper we provide such an analysis. We

first develop a theory of individual choice among

the three types of compensation. We then estimate the resulting share demand equations using
a unique data set, which has detailed information
on the compensation paid to roughly one-quarter
of the labor force in Jamaica in 1983. From these
data we are able to derive measures of reported

taxable income, evasion income, and avoidance
income for individual workers in the formal sec-

tor. We are also able to construct measures of the

marginal income tax rate, marginal payroll taxes
and benefits, the probability of detection, and the
penalty on evasion for individual workers. We are

therefore able to estimate for the first time the
responses of workers to the full range of tax
structure parameters.

Section I presents the theoretical model of
worker compensation choice and the empirical
specification of the model. Section II discusses
the Jamaican tax system. Data and variable con-

Received for publication March 31, 1989. Revision accepted
for publication February 22, 1990.

*University of Colorado at Boulder; Georgia State University; and The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, respectively.
We would like to thank Gerald Auten, Charles Clotfelter,
Don Waldman, Ann Witte, John Yinger, and two anonymous
referees for helpful comments.
For example, only Clotfelter (1983) uses micro-level mea-

struction are discussed in section III. Estimation
results are presented in section IV. The final
section summarizes the main results.

sion, but omit the marginal tax rate; they also use data
aggregated to the three-digit zip code level.

sures of compliance for U.S. taxpayers. He examines the

imnpact of the marginal tax rate on evasion, but does not
include a measure of the probability of detection. On the
other hand, Witte and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde
(1988), and Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1988) include the
audit rate as an explanatory variable in a compliance regres-

Copyright

2 For example, Goldstein and Pauly (1976), Long and Scott
(1982), and Woodbury (1983) examine only the substitution
between wage and nonwage compensation, while Clotfelter

(1983), Witte and Woodbury (1985), Dubin and Wilde (1988),
and Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1988) look only at the
reported-unreported income decision.
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604 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
I. Theoretical and Empirical Specification

Each worker is assumed to have a fixed amount
of total compensation I to allocate among re-

ported (R), evasion (E), and avoidance compensation (A). Reported compensation is subject to
income and payroll taxation at the combined rate

t, and yields payroll benefits at the rate b. Avoid-

ance compensation (called "allowances" in Ja-

maica) is not taxable under either the income or
payroll tax, and is given in an in-kind form, such
as entertainment, travel, or housing vouchers.

Evasion is subject to an uncertain return. If caught
evading with probability p, then the individual is
fined at the rate f on unpaid taxes, where f > 1.
If undetected, then evasion is neither taxed nor
fined.3

Because allowances are in-kind compensation,
the utility of the worker is assumed to be a
function both of allowances and of the sum of
reported and evasion compensation, net of taxes,
benefits, and penalties; utility is written as

U(I, A), where I is net money income. If caught,

net income I' equals [(R - tR + bR) +
(E - ftE)], while if not caught income IN is
[(R - tR + bR) + E]. The individual chooses R,
E, and A so as to maximize expected utility T.
A slightly different formulation is useful in the

empirical specification. Reported compensation
R is gross of taxes and benefits; it is net reported

where equation (1) is the constraint if the worker
is caught evading and equation (2) is the constraint if not caught.

Equations (1) and (2) allow a convenient interpretation. Consider the "price" of each type of

compensation, or the amount of gross compensation of each type that must be spent to obtain one
dollar of net compensation. These prices are defined by the expressions attached to R*, E*, and
A*. For example, a worker must allocate 1/
(1 - t + b) to gross reported compensation in
order to receive one dollar of net reported in-

come in either state of the world; that is, if the
worker pays taxes of 45% and receives benefits of
5% on gross reported income, then he must spend

$1.67 on gross R to get $1 of net R*. The price

PR of net compensation is therefore 1/(1 - t +

b). Note that this formulation yields the intuitive

result that either an increase in the tax rate or a
reduction in the benefit rate increases the cost of
reported income. Because PR is the same in

equations (1) and (2), the expected price of reported income PR is independent of the state of
the world, where the expected price is the price
in each state weighted by the probability of the
state.4 Similarly, the price of avoidance compen-

sation PA is unity in both states of the world
because A is not taxed; its expected price PA is
also unity and state independent. Unlike PA and

PR, the price of evasion PE depends upon the
income that enters the utility function via I' and

IN, where net reported income equals R(1 - t +

b). Similarly, net evasion income equals E(1 - ft)
if the worker is caught and E if not caught.
Denoting the net amounts of compensation by an

asterisk (*), the budget constraints can be written
in a way that makes clear how net R *, E *, and

A * depend upon the state of the world. These
constraints are
1

I R +E +A = ( t +?b R*

state of world. If the individual is caught evading,

then 1/(1 - ft) must be spent on gross evasion to
receive one dollar of net evasion; if not caught,

then the price is one. The expected price of

evasion PE therefore equals p[l/(l - ft)] +
(1 - p), so that an increase in p, f, or t increases
the cost of evasion.

The problem facing the worker is, then, one of
portfolio compensation choice:

Max T = pU(Ic, A) + (1 _ p)U(IN, A)

{R,E,A}

(3)
+ ( ft)E*+A* (1)

where IC and IN are defined above and I = R +
E + A.5 Individual optimization generates first-

I =R + E +A 1 - +b R*
+ E* +A*, (2)

4 Note, however, that the progressive rate structure of the
Jamaican income tax implies that PR is state dependent in the

3 The tax, benefit, and fine rates are assumed to be proportional and the probability of detection is assumed to be

empirical specification.

exogenous in order to simplify the exposition. The empirical

hours of work, and thus total compensation, are fixed and

specification, however, recognizes fully that in fact these are

predetermined, so that the behavioral responses are confined
to portfolio reallocations among R, E, and A. Also, the firm

nonlinear functions that vary with the levels of the arguments.

5 The formulation in equation (3) implicitly assumes that
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TAX STRUCTURE AND TAX COMPLIANCE 605
order conditions that contain the components of

practice, the base and progressivity are substan-

the prices, and that can also be solved for the

tially reduced. Taxpayers may receive up to six-

optimal choices of R, A, and E. These demand

teen credits for purposes such as participation in

equations can be represented by equations for

savings and insurance programs, employment of

the share of total income taken by each type of

household helpers, and personal and family cred-

gross compensation, where the shares depend

its. A more substantial narrowing of the base is

upon expected prices, total income, and various

due to the provision of nontaxable allowances to

control variables. Assuming that these variables

employees. Another loophole is the preferential

enter linearly, the share equations are

treatment of income earned from overtime activi-

ties, with all overtime taxed at the lowest marginal

Si = a, + l138j In Pj + Y4'ikXk,
i,j=R,E,Aandk=1,...,K (4)

rate of 30%. Finally, the base is narrowed by
outright evasion via underreporting of taxable

and nonfiling of income tax returns.
where S, is the proportion income
of total
compensation

I that is allocated to gross compensation type i;

Five separate payroll taxes, payable by both

workers and firms, are also levied on approxicharacterize

cai, 8j, and 4'k are parameters that
the workers' preferences; Pj is the expected mately
price the same base as the individual income
of income type j normalized by income; and Xk

tax. Of these five programs, three provide bene-

represents the control variables.6 It is these share

fits to individuals that are related to their contri-

equations that are estimated.

butions: the National Insurance Scheme (NIS)
gives disability and old-age benefits, the National

II. The Structure of the Jamaican

Housing Trust (NHT) provides various housing

Income Tax7

subsidies, and the Civil Service Family Benefits

The Government of Jamaica relies heavily upon

the individual income tax. In fiscal year 1983/84,
income tax collections were.28.9% of total government revenues and 7.6% of national income.

Over 90% of these revenues are collected from

employer withholding of taxes on employee wages

under the Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) system. The
remaining revenues come from individuals who
must file a return upon which taxes on other
sources of income are paid.
In theory, the Jamaican individual income tax

is broad-based with only interest income exempt,

and the rate structure is high and progressive.8 In
is assumed to equate the value of the marginal product of
labor to gross labor expense I for each worker; the firm is
therefore concerned only with the total compensation of each
worker. Finally, the model assumes that the firm responds
passively to worker preferences for the various types of compensation. Although this assumption is not ideal and is relaxed in the empirical model, it is commonly used. See, for
example, Goldstein and Pauly (1976), Long and Scott (1982),
and Woodbury (1983). See Cowell (1985) for a survey of the
theoretical literature on tax evasion.

6 These share equations are similar to those derived from
the transcendental logarithmic indirect utility function, where
independent variables enter linearly and prices are normalized by income. See, for example, Woodbury (1983).
The discussion here is of the system before a comprehensive reform in 1986.

Scheme (CSFBS) is a pension program for government workers. For these three programs nonpayment of payroll taxes implies the loss of future
benefits. The other two programs-the Education Tax and the Human Employment and Re-

source Training (HEART) Trust Fund-are taxes
and provide no benefits. The combined (employee plus employer) marginal tax rate in each
program is constant, varying from 2% for the

Education Tax to 5% for the NIS and NHT; the
tax rates for the HEART Fund and the CSFBS

are 3% and 4%, respectively. In total, payroll tax
revenues are roughly half of the revenues from

the income tax.

III. Data and Variable Construction
A. Data

Estimation of the share equations requires

measures of gross reported, avoidance, and evasion compensation for individual taxpayers. The

presence of a unique data set for Jamaica makes
it possible to construct these measures at the
individual level.
The Revenue Board of the Government of

Jamaica requested in summer 1984 that all Ja-

8The rate structure is 30% on the first J$7,000 of income;maican firms in the PAYE sector provide infor40% on J$7,001 to J$10,000; 45% on J$10,001 to J$12,000; mation on compensation for each employee in

50% on J$12,001 to J$14,000; and 57.5% on income in excess
of J$14,000.

1983. The government's request was not binding.
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606 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
However, firms were told that failure to respond

from the Revenue Board, analyzed the discrepan-

could lead to government examination of their

cies. The discovery of the withholding errors threw

records, so that there was some incentive to com-

into question the entire Jamaican withholding

ply and to ensure that information reported in

system, and much effort was made to discover the

the Survey was consistent with information re-

likely explanation for the mistakes. The initial

ported on various tax forms. By January 1985,

reaction was that the discrepancies were simply

1,345 firms had reported information for 69,724

random mistakes by the employer or the Income

workers (or 25% of the formal PAYE labor force),

Tax Department. This explanation is plausible for

at which point the government stopped compiling

some of the errors. The withholding system in

the data. Although the Revenue Board Survey is

Jamaica is complicated, and the calculations for

nonrandom, its distribution of taxpayers and their

each individual are generally made by hand. The

characteristics (income, taxes, and credits) is not

potential for error is substantial, and it is unlikely

statistically different from that of earlier, random

that the Income Tax Department would detect

samples of taxpayers.

such errors.

The government was concerned about the

However, government officials concluded that

growth in untaxed forms of compensation, and

this explanation was very unlikely. One reason is

the Survey was intended to provide information

that the withholding errors do not exhibit a ran-

on the extent of this practice. Each firm gave

dom pattern. If random, the errors should fall

information for each of its employees on taxable

equally on the side of underpayment and over-

cash compensation and nontaxable in-kind com-

payment; instead, there is a much higher fre-

pensation; they also reported taxes withheld and

quency of underreporting than of overreporting.

total tax credits. Although the Survey allows spe-

Of course, a poorly written tax code could pro-

cific firms to be identified, all individual informa-

duce such nonrandomness. However, if it is tax

tion is anonymous. It was initially believed that

code complexity that generates the discrepancies,

the Survey provided estimates only of what are

then these discrepancies should be largely inde-

called here reported income, and allowance in-

pendent of the level of taxpayer income, tax

come. However, detailed examination of these

bracket, credits, and the like. Probit analysis of

data revealed numerous instances in which there

the existence/nonexistence of the discrepancies

were serious discrepancies-shortfalls in most

as a function of these variables indicated that the

cases-between taxes actually withheld and the

discrepancies are in fact systematic, suggesting an

statutory liability implied by tax credits and in-

intent to defraud the authorities.9 Results from

come. Only 8% of the taxpayers in the Survey

an earlier, random sample of PAYE taxpayers

had no discrepancy; tax withholding shortfalls

who filed returns provided further evidence of

were identified for 66% of those in the Survey,

intent. These earlier data indicated that only 11%

while the remaining 26% were overpayers. As we

of the sample filed a return in order to pay

discuss in more detail below, we believe that

there is convincing evidence that the discrepancies are most likely due to intentional efforts to
defraud the tax authorities via tax evasion; that is,

9 Probit maximum likelihood estimation of a tax discrepancy
equation yields (with t-statistics in parentheses):
DISC = -1.261 + 8.164 MTR + 4.2*10-5 INCOME

we believe that cash compensation consists of

(10.48) (3.84) (9.40)

reported plus evasion compensation. The Survey

- 3.039 PEN - 14.443 PROB + 1.364 NB

therefore has micro-level information on al-

lowance, reported, and evasion income. We have
taken allowances as the measure of A; the Survey's measure of cash compensation has been

decomposed into estimates of R and E.
Because of the central role that these withhold-

ing discrepancies play in the estimation, it is
important that our interpretation of them be understood. This may be most easily explained by

describing the process by which we, working on a
tax reform study in conjunction with personnel

(2.10) (9.48) (1.53)
- 0.116 SIZE2 - 0.246 SIZE3

(2.16) (4.48)
- 0.094 SIZE4 + 0.363 PUBLIC

(1.57) (7.88)
N = 10,000; - 2 * log of likelihood ratio = 2578.1

where DISC indicates the presence or absence of tax withholding shortfalls; MTR is the marginal income tax rate on
gross compensation; INCOME is gross compensation; PEN
and PROB are the penalty function and probability of detection, respectively, as developed in the text; and NB represents
net marginal payroll tax benefits on gross income. The remaining variables are zero-one dummies to control for firm
size and sector of employment.
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TAX STRUCTURE AND TAX COMPLIANCE 607
additional taxes; the remaining 89% filed to re-

Revenue Board personnel thought that this

ceive a refund. This finding suggested that the

pattern of "overtime" income was completely

26% of the individuals in the Revenue Board

implausible. Third, nearly half of the Survey re-

Survey who had too much withheld will file for

ceived some amount of imputed "overtime"; al-

refunds, while the 66% of the Survey who under-

though there are no official government statistics

paid will simply enjoy the benefits of an illegally

on overtime, the presence of widespread over-

reduced tax liability.

time in a country with an official unemployment

Another possible explanation for the discrep-

rate of 27% in 1983 was questioned by Jamaican

ancies was that the apparent errors in withhold-

officials. Finally, and most importantly, govern-

ing could in fact represent correct tax liabilities, if

ment personnel records indicate that the vast

the taxpayer occupation was in sales, leading to

majority of public sector employees who earn

large business-related expenses. However, Ja-

more than J$10,000 are salaried workers, ineligi-

maican experts agreed that underpayment was far

ble for overtime income. Nevertheless, imputed

too prevalent and far too large for business ex-

"overtime" was pervasive among this group, more

penses to be a plausible explanation.

common than among comparable private sector

A third possible explanation for the withhold-

workers, with an astonishing 94% receiving some

ing discrepancies was that the errors reflected

"overtime." All of this "overtime" is necessarily

preferential taxation of legitimate overtime in-

illegal. "Overtime" was also pervasive among pri-

come. Since overtime is taxable at the lowest

vate sector workers, and Jamaican tax experts

marginal tax rate of 30%, even if nonovertime

believed that legitimate overtime was unlikely for

income is subject to a higher tax rate, the exis-

private sector employees in upper income classes.

tence of widespread overtime could therefore lead

For these reasons, government officials concluded

to numerous tax shortfalls.

that "overtime," even if present, must be largely

It is in fact likely that some individuals in the
Survey received some compensation for legiti-

income that was illegally taxed at a lower than
required rate.

mate overtime. However, government officials be-

The most convincing reason for the discrepan-

came convinced that legitimate overtime cannot

cies is therefore outright evasion. Of course, it is

explain the vast bulk of the errors. First, legiti-

logical to ask what incentive an employer would

mate overtime activity should have been present

have to accede to employee requests for under-

prior to the introduction of preferential treat-

withholding; if anything, a firm has an incentive

ment for overtime in 1983; however, information

to overwithhold, since it can retain the overwith-

from prior years indicated that overtime did not

held taxes for itself. The answer is simple, and is

seem to be used. Second, the pattern of discrep-

analogous in part to arguments for employer pro-

ancies by income class seemed wildly inconsistent

vision of fringe benefits: for a given total compen-

with the overtime explanation. If the discrepan-

sation cost to the firm, the employer can provide

cies were in fact attributable to legitimate over-

greater net compensation to the worker. The

time, then such imputed "overtime" would have

employer faces virtually no risk in this practice,

to account for over 60% of total income for those

since by law it is the employee who will be

who earned more than J$30,000, over 20% of
income for those in the J$20,000 to J$30,000

prosecuted if detected.11

category, roughly 10% for those in the J$10,000

gested several alternative explanations for the

to J$20,000 class, and virtually 0% for those making less than J$10,000; 40% of "overtime" would

withholding discrepancies: random error, busi-

have to accrue to the 15% of the Survey who

earned more than J$30,000; and on average
"overtime" would have to equal more than

J$6,000 for those earning more than J$30,000.10

In sum, close examination of the Survey sug-

I IIt remains possible that the discrepancies are in fact due
to overtime. However, as long as overtime is not truly legiti-

mate-and Jamaican experts think this certain-then there is
an element of evasion that is present in overtime, an element
that depends upon the same factors that determine what we

call evasion. The worker must therefore still choose among
reported,
10 Overtime income is not reported to the Income
Tax

evasion, and avoidance compensation, where eva-

Department, nor is it reported on the Survey. It is imputed

sion is now measured as imputed overtime income, and the

here by calculating the amount of compensation that would

have to have been received as overtime to yield an income tax

prices are slightly altered to reflect this change. As discussed
below, this specification has been estimated, and the results

liability consistent with that reported in the Survey.

are unaffected.
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608 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
ness expenses for salespeople, legitimate over-

labor bears the full burden of employee and

time income, illegitimate overtime income, and

employer shares of the various payroll taxes.13

outright evasion. There is no way to know for

2. Independent Variables: There are five com-

certain the exact reason for the discrepancies,

ponents of the "price" terms for reported and

and it is likely that all five sources of error play a

evasion compensation. The first component is the

role. However, Government of Jamaica personnel

marginal income tax rate on declared income.

with whom we worked concluded, and we con-

The specification of the rate reflects the possibil-

curred, that the dominant reason for the discrep-

ity that taxation of an additional dollar of re-

ancies was evasion.

ported income may yield no increased income tax

Cash compensation in the Survey therefore in-

liability if the taxpayer has sufficient tax credits.

cludes both reported income and evasion com-

To remove the problem of endogeneity of the

pensation. Cash compensation has been decom-

marginal tax rate, the rate is also calculated on

posed accordingly by calculating the amount of

the basis of total compensation.'4 This procedure

income that would have to have been reported to

is followed for the other components as well.

yield a tax liability consistent with the income and

The marginal penalty rate f affects both the

tax credit information provided in the Survey.

price of evasion income and the price of reported

This estimate is our empirical measure of re-

income."5 In Jamaican practice, a uniform penalty

ported income. Subtracting this estimate of re-

of 50% with no interest charge is imposed on all

ported income from cash compensation in the

delinquent income taxes, so that f equals 1.5.

Survey then yields our measure of evasion in-

However, although f is the same for all taxpay-

come.12 The estimated amounts of E, R, and A

ers, the marginal penalty term in the price of

are reported by statutory income class in table 1.

evasion varies across taxpayers because the

penalty is imposed on evaded taxes; the marginal
penalty term equals f times the marginal tax rate

B. Variable Specification

on gross (or true) compensation. Surprisingly, f

1. Dependent Variables:* The dependent variables in the three share demand equations are

the proportion of total compensation allocated to

gross reported income (SR), gross allowances (SA),
and gross evasion income (SE). Since the Survey
data are net of some firm and taxpayer specific
payroll taxes, it is necessary to gross-up these
figures to reflect the standard assumption that

also affects the price of R. If evasion is detected,

then the individual may be pushed into a higher
tax bracket in the progressive Jamaican tax structure. There is therefore an additional penalty
that enters the price of reported income that

equals f times the difference between the
marginal tax rate on reported plus evasion compensation and that on reported income only. This
penalty term is generated from the first-order
conditions of the model, and also varies across

taxpayers.
12 To illustrate, consider an individual whose Survey information shows cash compensation of J$7,000, tax credits of

The third component of the prices includes the

J$1,000, and income taxes withheld of J$500. There is clearly
a discrepancy between actual taxes withheld (or J$500) and
the true tax liability as suggested by the Survey data (or
J$1,100 = .3*J$7,000-J$1,000). To calculate the amount of

marginal payroll tax rates for both the employee

reported income R, solve for reported income from the rela-

tionship: .3*R - J$1,000 = J$500. This suggests a value of
reported income of J$5,000. Imputed evasion income is then
found by subtracting reported income from J$7,000, so that

evasion income E is J$2,000. It may appear that the calculation of evasion requires the assumption that credit information is correct. However, this is not the case; that is, the
estimate of E is unchanged even if it is assumed that evasion
occurs via overstating of credits rather than underreporting of
income. For example, assume for the above taxpayer that

taxes withheld of J$500 are correct. Then credits would have
to equal J$1,600 (not J$1,000) for taxes withheld to equal
J$500, since taxes on J$7,000 are J$2,100. At a marginal tax
rate of 30%, the overstating of credits by J$600 is worth
J$2,000 (or J$600/.3), which is identical to the above estimate
of evasion.

and employer shares of the programs. These payroll tax rates are assumed to apply to both forms

of cash compensation (R and E) because the
Survey provides no information on payroll taxes
withheld at source (unlike the income tax). It is
13 Alternative incidence assumptions have been used in the
construction of the variables and in the estimation, with no
significant effects on the results.

14 For example, a taxpayer with R = J$9,000, E = J$2,000,
and A = J$4,000 has total compensation of J$15,000. The
"first-dollar marginal tax rate" is calculated on I = R + E +
A, and equals 57.5%.
15 This is explicit in the derivation of the prices when the
progressive Jamaica tax structure is introduced formally. The
precise forms of the prices and their derivation are available
upon request.
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TAX STRUCTURE AND TAX COMPLIANCE 609
TABLE 1.-DISTRIBUTION OF EVASION INCOME, REPORTED INCOME, AND ALLOWANCE INCOME
(DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS OF JAMAICAN DOLLARS)

Number of Evasion Income Reported Income Allowance Income Total Compensation
Income Classa Taxpayers Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
Under J$ 2,000 7,385 J$ 0.0 0.0 J$ 7,500.0 1.4 J$ 535.1 0.7 J$ 8,035.1 1.2
2,001-4,000 9,072 458.7 2.2 26,781.0 4.9 1,805.1 2.2 29,044.8 4.5
4,001-6,000 9,370 779.2 3.8 47,332.0 8.6 3,620.5 4.4 51,731.7 8.0
6,001-8,000 10,778 1,795.2 8.7 74,600.0 13.6 6,435.9 7.9 82,831.1 12.7
8,001-10,000 12,242 3,271.0 15.9 109,698.0 20.0 10,743.8 13.1 123,712.8 19.0
10,001-12,000 10,242 3,262.6 15.9 108,307.0 19.8 11,045.6 13.5 122,615.2 18.9
12,001-14,000 4,163 1,643.2 8.0 52,145.0 9.5 8,624.2 10.5 62,412.4 9.6
14,001-16,000 2,313 1,397.7 6.8 32,997.0 6.0 7,773.5 9.5 42,168.2 6.5
16,001-18,000 1,065 827.2 4.0 17,201.0 3.1 5,045.4 6.2 23,073.6 3.5
18,001-20,000 796 802.0 3.9 14,277.0 2.6 4,656.4 5.7 19,735.4 3.0
20,001-25,000 880 1,357.1 6.6 18,096.0 3.3 7,539.7 9.2 26,942.8 4.2
25,001-30,000 487 1,070.5 5.2 12,190.0 2.2 4,801.1 5.9 18,061.6 2.8
30,001-50,000 632 1,811.4 8.8 21,195.0 3.9 7,576.5 9.2 30,582.9 4.7

Over J$50,000 99 2,055.3 10.0 5,309.0 1.0 1,708.7 2.1 9,073.0 1.4
Total 69,724 J$20,531.1 100.0 J$547,628.0 99.9 J$81,911.5 100.1 J$650,070.6 100.0
d Based upon taxable income as reported in the Revenue Board Survey.

thus impossible to determine the degree of com-

pliance with the payroll tax programs."6
The fourth component of the prices is the

marginal payroll tax benefit function. The NIS,
the NHT, and the CSFBS payroll programs provide contribution-related benefits. For these programs, it is possible to specify a marginal benefit

ual tax returns for 1980 to 1982.18 These data are
detailed line-by-line audits of 148 tax returns.
The conditional probability of detection given an

audit is estimated using this sample of audited
returns, and then predicted for those in the Survey as a function of the reported values for tax
credits, income, and the marginal tax rate.19

function that reflects the institutional features of

These various components are combined in

the appropriate plan. Payroll benefits equal the

terms that measure the prices of R, E, and A.

additional benefits that accrue from earning and

The prices are similar to those discussed earlier,

paying payroll taxes on an additional dollar of

but reflect the nonlinear functions of the Ja-

compensation."

maican tax structure.

The final price component is the probability of

While the firm has not been modeled as an

detection. The measure used here is arrived at

active participant in the compensation choice

indirectly. We assume that the subjective views

process, it is important empirically to recognize

that determine the individual's perceived proba-

variations in the willingness or ability of firms or

bility of detection are derived from the experi-

sectors to supply various types of compensation.

ence of those audited in Jamaica. This probability

A dummy variable is included for the sector of

is calculated as the product of the probability of

employment, public versus private. Dummy vari-

being audited and the probability of detecting

ables are also included to capture the effects of

evasion given that an audit has occurred. The first
probability is a closely guarded secret of the
Income Tax Department. It is estimated by divid-

18 Beron, Tauchen, and Witte (1988) and Dubin and Wilde

ing the total number of returns that were exam-

(1988) discuss the issues surrounding the appropriate specifi-

ined by the Department over the period 1980 to

cation of an audit equation, and apply this technique using
aggregate data for the United States.

1982 by the total number of filers. Based on
recent work in which the probability of audit is
shown to be endogenous, the second conditional

probability is a predicted one, estimated by applying a probit model to a sample of audited individ-

19 The probit maximum likelihood estimation results are
(t-statistics are in parentheses):

AUDIT= 0.89 + 3.0*10-5 INCOME + 0.61 MTR
(3.12) (1.93) (2.06)
- 2.4 * 10-3 CREDIT
(1.59)
N = 148; - 2 * log of likelihood ratio = 284.65

16 Note that this assumption on payroll tax withholding
does
where
AUDIT indicates whether or not the audited return
not affect the estimates of compensation shares, and has only
a minor effect on their prices.

17 The benefit calculations are available upon request.

was found to have discrepancies; INCOME is the value of
gross income; MTR is the marginal tax rate; and CREDIT is
the value of tax credits.
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firm size, where firm size is measured in terms of

table 2. Estimates are provided for the entire

the number of employees; larger firms typically

subsample, as well as its public sector and private

pay higher wages and provide more extensive

sector components.

nonwage compensation. Unfortunately, the Sur-

The own-price coefficients possess the proper

vey does not include any information on charac-

sign and (with the exception of the own-price of

teristics that might reflect individual preferences,

reported compensation in the public sector sub-

and the individual anonymity in the Survey does

sample, fBRR) are statistically significant. The

not allow its matching with other sources.

cross-price coefficients exhibit symmetry in the

3. Estimation Technique:20 Estimation of the

signs, a result that is largely consistent across

share equations poses several problems. As is

samples and is encouraging in the absence of

well known, the three share equations can be

explicit cross-equation restrictions. The signs of

estimated by dropping one equation and estimat-

the cross-prices I3EA and J3AE indicate that eva-

ing the remaining two equations as a system.

sion and avoidance compensation are substitutes,

However, due to the high frequency of censored

and reflects the fact that both are effective vehi-

dependent variables across the shares-34% of

cles for reduction in tax liability. This result poses

the observations have a zero evasion share, 44%

a serious dilemma for policymakers. For example,

have a zero avoidance share, and 22% have a

an increase in the penalty or the probability of

unity wage share-the usual normal error as-

detection increases the price of evasion compen-

sumption of the system framework will be vio-

sation and (ignoring for the moment the impact

lated, and parameter estimates will be biased and

on reported compensation) causes a portfolio re-

inconsistent. Alternatively, a technique such as

allocation that leads to the substitution of A

Tobit maximum likelihood estimation, which ad-

income for E income. Therefore, better enforce-

dresses the censoring problem, could be used.

ment will not necessarily increase the tax base if

Unfortunately, neither the theoretical foundation

there are loopholes in the system that can be

nor the econometric software for the estimation

exploited by evaders.

of a system of censored equations with cross-

Reported and avoidance compensation are also

equation restrictions has been developed to

substitutes. Increases in marginal tax rates or

date.21 We are thus faced with a choice between

reductions in payroll tax benefits increase the

two imperfect estimation methods. Either we

price of R, and cause individuals to choose more

estimate the system with appropriate cross-

A. Here, policy choices are easier: tax rates can

equation restrictions but ignore the censoring

be reduced or payroll tax benefits increased, lead-

problem; or we recognize the censoring problem,

ing to a direct increase in the reported tax base

appeal to the consistency of single equation To-

(own-price effect) and a reduction in avoidance
activities (cross-price effect).

bit, but ignore the cross-equation restrictions. We
have chosen to make use of both methods. Fortu-

Somewhat surprisingly, PER and /3RE indicate

nately, the results are quite similar, and so we

that evasion and reported compensation are com-

report only the Tobit estimates.22

plements. Higher prices for reported (or evasion)

IV. Estimation Results

Tobit maximum likelihood coefficient estimates

for the three share equations are reported in

compensation induce a portfolio reallocation that
reduces the evasion (or reported) compensation
share. Still, these responses are plausible. If, say,
a reduction in the marginal tax rate lowers the
price of R, then E may increase because the

lower tax rate also lowers PE. Similarly, an in20 The entire Revenue Board Survey is not used in estimating the model due to the computational cost. The estimation
results are based upon a 10,000 observation random subsam-

ple of 4,982 public and 5,018 private sector workers. The

estimation results for different subsamples are very similar to
those presented below.

21 Some of the difficulties are explored in Amemiya (1974)

crease in the price of evasion may lower both SE
and SR, as individuals substitute into avoidance

activity. Finally, because higher penalties directly
raise the price of evasion and, due to tax progres-

and Huang, Sloan, and Adamache (1987).

sivity, raise the price of reported income as well,

measured as imputed overtime income, with reported income

direction.

these compensation
shares may move in a similar
22 We have also estimated a specification in which evasion
is

and prices recalculated accordingly. The elasticity of reported
income with respect to each of the various policy parameters
is largely the same.

Taken in their entirety, the estimated price
coefficients suggest a complicated behavioral re-
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TABLE 2.-TOBIT ESTIMATION RESULTS

Parameter Coefficient Estimates

Survey Private Public

Symbol Definition Subsample Sector Sector
PEE Own-price of evasion - 1.2744a - 0.9030a - 2.6676a
(0.2646) (0.3028) (0.5760)

PEA Avoidance income cross- 1.2689a 0.8892a 2.5361a
price; evasion share (0.2554) (0.2956) (0.5455)

PER Reported income cross- - 1.0296a - 0.9931a - 0.7605a
price; evasion share (0.0968) (0.1214) (0.1621)

PAE Evasion income cross- 2.2319a 0.4262 12.4711a

price; avoidance share (0.2584) (0.2976) (0.5791)

PAA Own-price of avoidance - 3.8091a - 1.9637a - 13.3816a
(0.2476) (0.2880) (0.5489)

PAR Reported income cross- 1.319oa 1.2603a 0.4763a
price; avoidance share (0.0898) (0.1163) (0.1515)
J.3RE Evasion income cross- - 2.2574a - 0.3243 - 10.7878a
price; reported share (0.2528) (0.2859) (0.5586)

JPRA Avoidance income cross- 3.4515a 1.5738a 11.2714a
price; reported share (0.2416) (0.2759) (0.5279)
PRR Own-price of reported - 0.6147a - 0.6388a 0.2430
income

(0.0851)

(0.1081)

(0.1449)

PE1 Firm size control; - 0.0444 - 0.0532 0.0191
evasion share (0.0457) (0.0475) (0.2311)

PE2 Firm size control; 0.0163 0.0460 -0.0517

evasion share (0.0461) (0.0493) (0.2255)

OE3 Firm size control; -0.0156 -0.2483a 0.1981

evasion share (0.0493) (0.0595) (0.2230)

(4'YW1 4 4Nxcsm%* J ' -t.I?A4 evasion share (0.0324)

PA1 Firm size control; 0.1871a 0.1884a - 0.7175a
avoidance share (0.0502) (0.0531) (0.2298)

PA2 Firm size control; 0.2253a 0.2956a - 0.8838a
avoidance share (0.0501) (0.0540) (0.2228)

PA3 Firm size control; 0.4408a 0.2145a - 0.4760a
avoidance share (0.0530) (0.0631) (0.2193)

OA4 Public sector dummy; - 0.1625a
avoidance share (0.0337)

'kR1 Firm size control; - 0.1012a - 0.0637 0.542la

reported share (0.0435) (0.0454) (0.2151)

OR2 Firm size control; -0.1648a -0.1409a 0.6918a
reported share (0.0438) (0.0470) (0.2094)

OR3 Firm size control; - 0.0939 0.0365 0.5859

reported share (0.0468) (0.0563) (0.2069)

OR4 Public sector dummy; 0.1794a

reported share (0.0309)
aE Intercept; evasion - 8.4740a - 8.3435a - 7.2743a
share (0.2888) (0.3727) (0.4953)
aA Intercept; avoidance - 3.5242a - 3.6797a - 4.3305a
share (0.2226) (0.3037) (0.4184)
aR Intercept; reported 13.2761a 11.7570 18.4220a
share (0.2345) (0.3128) (0.4400)
Note: Coefficient estimates are reported with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. il represents firms

with 20-100 employees; Oi2 represents firms with 100-500 employees; and i3 represents firms with more than 500

employees.

a Significant at the 0.05 level.

sponse to various policy instruments. As an exam-

be negative, actually implying a lower reported

ple, consider the behavioral response that might

tax base, and the cross-price effect on avoidance

follow from administrative improvements that in-

would increase SA. Clearly, this is an undesirable

crease the probability of detecting evasion. This

and unintended outcome.

policy change would lead to a negative own-price

The remaining estimation results pertain to

effect on the evasion share. However, the cross-

two sets of control variables. Public sector work-

price effect on reported compensation would also

ers take smaller shares of avoidance compensa-
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tion and larger shares of reported compensation.

observation to yield the change in the level of the

The public sector may be more interested in

declared base.

setting an example and preventing abuse of the

The tax base elasticities are all extremely small,

allowance system. There may also be less concern

which likely arises because individuals are subject

over abusing the allowance loophole in the pri-

to income tax withholding. The largest response

vate sector and thus less monitoring of worker

stems from an increase in the marginal income

claims for avoidance compensation.

tax rate, and is only - 0.1898. This negative own-

The effect of firm size differs across sectors, a

price response on the reported compensation

fact that cannot be isolated without decomposing

share does not appear to be large enough to be a

the sample into public and private sectors. In

major concern to policymakers. The other elastic-

general, evasion shares are independent of firm

ities are even smaller: the penalty elasticity is

size. However, avoidance shares are positively

- 0.0810; the payroll benefits elasticity is 0.0708;

related to firm size in the private sector and

and the probability elasticity is essentially zero

negatively related in the public sector. Perhaps

(- 0.0048). Note again that an increase in either

larger private sector firms make more extensive

the penalty multiplier or the probability of detec-

use of avoidance income due to the nature of the

tion has the undesirable effect of slightly lowering

private sector production process, while larger

the reported tax base.

public sector employers may frown upon the provision of nontaxable allowances.

policy lessons. First, because the elasticities are

Although the price responses are of consider-

very small, large discretionary changes in policy

These results suggest a number of important

able interest, the independent effects of varia-

are necessary to induce a significant impact on

tions in the policy parameters embedded in these

the tax base. Second, individuals are less influ-

prices are of greater interest. The impacts on

enced by the expected penalties associated with

compliance of increases in the penalty multiplier,
the probability of detection, marginal payroll tax

evasion than with the rewards from lower income

benefits, and the marginal income tax rate can be

forcement regime as a significant deterrent to tax

simulated using the reported income compensa-

evasion. Third, the interrelationships among com-

tax rates. Clearly, they do not perceive the en-

tion share equation. The change in the expected

pensation types indicate that policy cannot be

value of the reported income share attributable

used in isolation to influence the choice of one

to a marginal increase in a given policy parameter

compensation type unless the implications for

is

other forms of compensation are identified. Finally, the major lesson is that comprehensive

X = F(Z)'RR d + F(Z)ARE d

reform of the rate, base, and administration of

the income tax is necessary to improve compliance. For example, a large reduction in the

+F(Z)I

A

(5)

marginal income tax rate will result in a net
revenue reduction because the direct revenue

loss from lower rates is not offset by the base

where Xj is the jth policy variable, F(Z) is the
cumulative distribution function of a standard

expansion resulting from lower rewards for eva-

sion and avoidance. Consequently, the best way

normal variable evaluated at the mean of the

to ensure that structural rate and base changes

conditional Tobit coefficients (not reported). The

duce simultaneously changes in the entire system.

have the desired effect
Tobit
A

A

A

on compliance is to intro-

ind

terms d ln PR/d Xj, d ln PE/dXj, and d ln PA/dXj
are simulated numerically by calculating the
change in the log of the prices resulting from a

1% increase in the relevant policy parameter.23
The resultant changes in the reported income
shares are then transformed for each individual
23

Since avoidance is the numeraire, d In PA/dXJ = 0.

V. Conclusions

The decision to comply-or not to complywith the individual income tax depends fundamentally upon the incentives introduced by the
tax system. The results presented here suggest
that individuals respond to these incentives in
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choosing whether to pay, avoid, or evade taxes;
that is, incentives matter, and individuals will
increase their tax compliance if tax rates are

lowered or if payroll benefits are increased, while
they will actually comply less if more severe
penalties are imposed or if detection becomes
more certain. However, these responses are gen-

erally quite small. Thus, if structural reform is to
be used to combat evasion and avoidance, major

changes may be necessary to elicit a significant
response from taxpayers, and the impacts of re-

form on all compensation types must be carefully

identified to achieve the desired results.
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